Editors' Summary
In the near future the use of coal may be legally restricted due to concerns over the effects of its combustion on atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations . Carbon capture and geologic sequestration offer one method to reduce carbon emissions from coal and other hydrocarbon fuel . While the federal government is providing increased funding for carbon capture and storage, congressional legislative efforts to limit carbon emissions have failed . However, regional and state bodies have taken significant actions both to regulate carbon and to facilitate its capture and storage, addressing the technical and legal problems that must be resolved in order to have a viable carbon storage program . Several regional bodies have formed regulations and model laws that affect carbon capture and storage, and three bodies comprising 23 states have cap-and-trade programs in various stages of development . New state laws are being enacted that encourage carbon storage, and existing state laws affect the liability and viability of carbon storage projects . A subsequent Article will examine specific legislation concerning carbon capture and storage, or the lack of it, in 18 western states .
I. Carbon Storage
Carbon sequestration may be accomplished through either storage in a geologic depository or by using a biologic process in which carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is removed from the atmosphere by plants that store carbon . 1 Biological sequestration is a well-established and cost-effective way to sequester carbon, but it is difficult to quantify the benefits . Geologic sequestration involves the separation of CO 2 from an exhaust gas stream and compressing it, transporting it to a suitable site, and injecting it into a deep underground formation . It will be some time in the future before sequestration in geologic formations is proven to be an effective and economical way to reduce CO 2 emissions to the atmosphere, but a major benefit from developing effective geologic sequestration is that America's abundant supply of coal could be utilized without the adverse environmental impacts associated with CO 2 emissions . However, there are risks from geologic sequestration that have been identified, including changes in soil chemistry that could harm the ecosystem, effects on water quality due to acidification, effects of geologic stability, and the CCS will dramatically increase the cost of energy . In 2009, DOE stated that CCS will increase the cost of electricity from a new pulverized coal plant by about 75% and will increase the cost of electricity from a new advanced gasification-based plant by about 35% . 14 Overall CO 2 storage costs are estimated at $25 to $90 per metric ton, depending on the source . 15 DOE estimates that storage from an IGCC facility will increase the average cost of electricity from 7 .8 cents per kWh to 10 .2 cents per kWh . 16 A report prepared at the University of Utah found the cost of carbon capture to be about $40 per ton and underground storage costs about $10 per ton, which would add 7 . 5 cents to the cost of a kWh . 17 This cost would be added to the average delivered 8 . Id. 9 . IPCC Special Rep ., supra note 2, at 341 . 10 . Id potential for large releases that could harm or suffocate people and animals . 2 After a brief discussion of the main components of CO 2 storage (CO 2 capture, transportation, storage, and longterm liability), this Article explores major legal and policy actions taken by regional and state bodies that will impact CO 2 storage . Federal control of geologic storage has been covered in another publication . 3 
A. Carbon Capture
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) begins by separating CO 2 from other gases, which may be done before or after fuel is combusted . 4 Post-combustion capture involves concentrating the exhaust gases into a stream of nearly pure CO 2 , and then compressing it to convert it from gas to a supercritical fluid before it is transported to the injection site by pipeline . CO 2 may be captured and sequestered from fossil-fueled power plants or from industrial processes, including the production of hydrogen and other chemicals, the production of substitute natural gas, and the production of transportation fuel .
The majority of the costs of storage result from separating and capturing CO 2 from flue gas . 5 Carbon capture from the flue gas of coal-burning power plants will be more expensive than the carbon capture used by industrial processes that involve more concentrated streams of CO 2 . The low concentration of CO 2 in conventional post-combustion gas streams means that large volumes of flue gas must be processed to remove their conventional pollutants, which can limit the effectiveness of certain carbon capture processes . Conventional power plant CO 2 emissions are about 13% to 15% by volume, which increases energy requirements needed to remove a given quantity of CO 2 from the gas stream compared to gas streams with higher concentrations of CO 2 . 6 If the nitrogen in air is removed prior to combustion, such as occurs in the oxyfuel process, the CO 2 in the exhaust stream is concentrated, and it is less costly to separate a given amount of the gas . 7 Integrated Gasifica-MW power plant using 13,000 tons per day of Powder River Basin coal would produce about 26,824 tons of CO 2 per day . 26 CO 2 , in the super critical state used for injection, has a density of 0 .03454 cubic feet per pound or about 69 cubic feet per ton . 27 Thus, a modern power plant could be expected to need to transport liquid CO 2 in an amount of over 1 .85 million cubic feet each day, which is equivalent to the volume of a football field over 32 . 13 feet deep . 28 Electrical generation in 2008 in the United States produced 2,363 . 5 million metric tons of CO 2 . 29 This would result in the generation of 163,081 million cubic feet of super critical CO 2 per year, which is a column one square mile at its base and over 1 . 11 miles high . 30 In addition to the significant engineering and economic issues concerning transporting CO 2 , carbon storage raises legal issues concerning CO 2 transport and the potential liability for transportation mishaps . CO 2 is compressed into a supercritical fluid for transport, usually via a pipeline, to a site where it can be injected far below the ground . Safety regulations for these pipelines will be within the jurisdiction of the U .S . Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for pipelines that affect interstate commerce . The PHMSA also provides minimum standards for states that regulate intrastate pipelines .
Before large-scale CO 2 transport occurs, the agency with responsibility for rates and terms of service for interstate CO 2 pipelines must develop regulations . The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has the statutory responsibility to regulate sites, rates, and terms for interstate natural gas pipelines . However, FERC does not appear to have legal authority over CO 2 pipelines . The Surface Transportation Board (STB) has jurisdiction over pipelines that transport any commodity other than water, gas, or oil . 31 But the STB's predecessor interpreted its statutory authority to exclude all gas types, including CO 2 . Thus, it would CO 2 that weighs 3 .664 times the weight of the carbon, based on the atomic weights of oxygen and carbon . Babcock & Wilcox, Steam, Its Generation and Use 2-4, 2-8, tbl . 10 (37th ed . 1960 Dec . 30, 2010) . 26 . For Powder River Basin coal, 13,000 tons of coal per day, minus its moisture content, multiplied by its carbon content is the weight of the carbon, and multiplied by the relative weight of CO 2 will produce 26,824 tons per day of CO 2 (13,000 x .76 x .741 x 3 .664) . Calculated from data found in Babcock & Wilcox, supra note 25, at 2-8, 2-9 . 27 . Chemical Engineer Handbook, 5th ed . 3-162 (Robert H . Perry ed .
1953) . The IPCC Special Report, supra note 2, provides a range of numbers, but says the density is 1,032 kilograms per cubic meter at 20 degrees C and 19 .7 bar pressure, which converts to 64 .4 pounds per cubic foot . 28 . An NFL football field is 360 by 160 feet, which is 57,600 square feet . See http://www .sportsknowhow .com (last visited Dec . 30, 2010) . A power plant's production of 26,824 tons per day of CO 2 at 69 cubic feet per ton results in 1 .85 million cubic feet of super critical CO 2 . Divided by 57,600, this gives a depth of 32 .13 feet .
. U .S, Envtl . Protection Agency (EPA), 2010 Inventory of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks, at 3-1, available at http://www .epa .gov/climatechange/ emissions/downloads10/US-GHG-Inventory-2010_Chapter3-Energy .pdf . 30 . 5,280 x 5,280 = 27 .88 million sq . ft . 163,081 million/ 27 .88 million = 5,849 .4 ft or 1 .11 miles . 31 . 49 U .S .C . §15301 . appear that legislation is needed to establish which agency will regulate pipelines used for CO 2 transport . 32 If pipelines are to be constructed, "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) opposition should be expected . In Montana, H .B . 338 became law on April 16, 2009, which grants owners of pipelines transporting CO 2 common carrier status . This allows them to use eminent domain over private property owners . 33 
C. CO 2 Storage
There appear to be more than adequate geological formations to use as potential storage reservoirs, although detailed study will need to be performed prior to using a specific formation as a CO 2 repository . 34 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 requires the U .S . Geological Survey (USGS) to develop a methodology to determine the capacity for CO 2 storage in the United States and to then assess the capacity . 35 On June 3, 2009, the U .S . Department of the Interior (DOI), in consultation with DOE, the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the USGS, issued their report recommending a framework for identifying suitable CO 2 storage sites . 36 The report is more conservative than DOE estimates, because it does not include coal deposits as potential storage sites 37 ; it only evaluates available sites that are 3,000 to 13,000 feet deep; and it limits evaluation to sites that can store 2 million cubic meters of CO 2 or more . This amount could be emitted in a short time by a single coal-burning power plant . The report does evaluate oil and gas reservoirs and saline formations . Saline formations are deep beneath the surface and often are filled with water with a high salt content and topped with an impervious cap that prevents the loss of the sequestered CO 2 because of physical and geochemical trapping . 38 Issues of concern in the report include the effect of storage on mineral extraction and surface activities, such as grazing, recreation, and community development . Sites also need to be evaluated for their potential to induce earthquakes . 39 CO 2 storage can be based on physical trapping or geochemical trapping . With physical trapping, the buoyant CO 2 is trapped by rock, such as shale or carbonates, that inhibits migration of the CO 2 from the porous formations, such as sandstone, where it is stored . The pore spaces that will receive the CO 2 usually contain other gases and liquids, primarily brine, that will be displaced or have their 32 . GAO pressure increased by the injection . 40 Geothermal trapping occurs when CO 2 reacts chemically with minerals in the geological formation and forms solid minerals . 41 It is expected that the CO 2 will be injected at depths of over 800 meters (2,600 feet) into geological formations that will sequester it for hundreds to thousands of years . 42 While CO 2 injection has been widely used to enhance oil recovery and to force methane out of coal beds for recovery and use, 43 we do not yet have much experience with injection on the scale that will be required for geological storage of CO 2 from electric power plants for time spans in excess of human civilization . Such storage will require dealing with the properties of flue gas from fossil-fuel combustion . That includes the relative buoyancy of CO 2 , its mobility within subsurface formations, the corrosive properties of the gases in water, the impact of the impurities in the flue gas, and the large volume of material that will need to be injected . The supercritical liquid will be injected, using proven technology, at a depth of about 800 meters (2,625 feet) in order to keep the CO 2 in a supercritical state where it cannot be distinguished whether it is in a liquid or a gas phase . 44 It is estimated by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that about 10,000 large-scale CCS projects will be needed by 2050 to hold global warming to three degrees Celsius by the end of this century . There are now four: Sleipner in the North Sea and Snohvit in the Barents Sea, Norway, both operated by StatoilHydro; the Salah project in Algeria, operated by British Petroleum, Somatrach, and StatoilHydro; and the North Dakota facility discussed below . 45 Since 1996, the Sleipner project has captured about 3,000 metric tons of CO 2 per day from its natural gas extraction, and it is stored 800 meters under the North Sea's seabed in a saline reservoir . 46 Some CO 2 is captured at natural gas plants, but it is not sequestered . 47 The only coal-burning facility in North America that sequesters CO 2 is the Great Plains Synfuels Plant in North Dakota, owned by the Dakota Gasification Company that is a subsidiary of Basin Electric Cooperative . It is a synthetic natural gas facility, where coal is gasified to make methane and in this process, CO 2 , sulfur dioxide, and mercury are removed from the gas stream . The gas stream, which is 96% CO 2 , is pressurized until it is in a supercritical state, which results in the gas becoming as dense as a liquid, but it flows like a gas . It is then transported 205 miles by pipeline to an oil field near Weyburn, Saskatchewan, Canada, where it is injected into one of 37 injection wells used to enhance oil recovery . The facility began sequestering CO 2 in 2000 . It handles 8,000 metric tons of CO 2 each day . 48 None of the four existing storage projects was designed for long-term storage . They all are used to enhance hydrocarbon recovery . However, it appears that some of the injected CO 2 may remain in the depleted oil reservoirs permanently . 49 DOE, on December 4, 2009, announced three new projects that will receive up to $979 million in federal funds, to be leveraged with $2 .2 billion in private funds to help demonstrate commercial-size CCS deployment . American Electric Power, Inc . will design, construct, and operate a chilled ammonia capture process projected to capture 90% of the CO 2 from a 235-MW flue gas stream at the 1,300-MW Mountaineer Power Plant near New Haven, West Virginia . The CO 2 will be injected into two saline formations approximately 1 . 5 miles below the surface . 50 The Southern Company Services will retrofit a 160-MW flue gas stream at Alabama Power's Barry facility near Mobile, Alabama, to capture CO 2 and sequester up to one million metric tons per year in deep saline formations . 51 Summit Texas Clean Energy, LLC, will capture 90% of the CO 2 at a 400-MW plant to be built near Midland-Odessa, Texas . The CO 2 will be compressed and transported to oilfields in the Permian Basin of west Texas to be used for enhanced oil recovery . 52 President Barack Obama announced on February 3, 2010, that he was establishing an interagency task force to speed the development of CCS technologies, and its primary mission was to get five to ten commercial-scale storage projects operational by 2016 . 53 Many technical problems need to be overcome in order to have a viable carbon storage program, but cost-effective environmental protection requirements, settlement of the ownership issues concerning carbon storage, and resolution of long-term liability are also issues that need to be resolved . Perhaps the first step will be to define CO 2 for the purposes of a CCS program . The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) has defined CO 2 as "anthropogenically sourced CO 2 of sufficient purity and quality as to not compromise the safety and efficiency of the reservoir containing the CO 2 . "
54 While large-scale CCS has not yet occurred, a body of law has developed concerning enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and the use of geologic reservoirs for the storage of natural gas that can be used to help shape an appropriate legal regimen for CCS . EOR usually involves a unitized operation, where all owners receive a portion of the benefits coming from EOR . This reduces the potential conflicts, since all property owners are participants . If operations have not been unitized, the operator would have significant exposure to tort or property-based litigation . 55 Natural gas storage requires compliance with the state law on ownership of the depleted oil and gas reservoir pore space . Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, interstate pipelines have eminent domain powers that apply to subsurface storage facilities . 56 Storage of natural gas requires payment to the subsurface owner of the fair market value of the right to store natural gas, "but the law of valuation remains unclear in most states and is largely undecided . "
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II. Regional Storage Efforts
In an effort to control and influence greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation, some states work with the IOGCC, which represents the oil and gas interests of its 38 member states and nine international affiliates and has been an advocate of states' rights to govern petroleum resources within their borders . 58 Because the IOGCC views CCS as one of the best available methods to deal with the CO 2 released from current methods of fossil-fueled electric power generation, it formed a Geological Sequestration Task Force in 2002 . In 2007, the task force, now the Carbon Capture and Storage Task Force, produced a comprehensive model legal and regulatory framework for geologic storage of CO 2 that advocates state-and provincial-level regulation of stored CO 2 . 59 Other efforts to control GHG regulation and influence federal policy led 23 eastern, midwestern, and western states to participate in three different regional approaches to GHG control . 60 Although each group emphasizes different goals and uses different paths to regulate and enforce its policies, these regional bodies provide varying levels of cooperation, investment, and direction for addressing climate change issues . Since 2005, cap-and-trade programs have been the main approach favored by regional programs attempting to reduce emissions of GHGs, with some programs specifically incorporating CCS as one type of reduction method . The oldest and most developed group, the 55 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), has quarterly allowance auctions that have raised over $729 million . Each of the three regional groups takes a different stance on how CCS will fit into its system . Recently, these regional groups have collaborated on policy and may be looking for broader influence on national solutions by adopting common approaches to dealing with GHGs and cap-and-trade regulations . 61 The material that follows discusses these regional developments, but whether these efforts survive is unknown . Federal legislation like the U .S . House of Representatives-passed H .R . 2454 would block the use of state or regional programs from 2012 to 2017, even if the federal program does not begin in 2012, as called for in the legislation . The U .S . Senate Bill 1733 also includes a moratorium on sub-national programs during 2012 to 2017, but it allows existing programs to continue until nine months after the first auction of federal allowances . 62 But while federal legislation has stalled during 2010, the regional groups are pushing forward to establish policy and organize actual and projected GHG auctions .
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A. Regional Programs-the IOGCC
While the IOGCC's main mission is to help states develop regulatory policies to maximize their oil and gas resources, it established a task force on carbon storage because of member states' interest in "the most immediate and viable strategies available for mitigating the release of CO 2 into the atmosphere . " 64 The resulting guide, issued in 2007, derived from the task force's conclusion that states had the best experience, expertise, and jurisdiction to regulate CCS . 65 The IOGCC emphasizes state control rather than a regional approach, and the guide suggests legal regulations for CCS to facilitate and protect state interests .
The IOGCC defines CO 2 as "anthropogenically sourced carbon dioxide of sufficient purity and quality as to not compromise the safety and efficiency of the reservoir to effectively contain carbon dioxide . regulatory frameworks for emissions trading should use the regulatory experience of the states, especially for natural gas and underground storage . Based on its analysis of states' experience with property rights, resource management, and tort issues such as trespass and damages, the IOGCC makes the following recommendations related to CCS:
• State oil and gas regulatory agencies are the most logical and best equipped agencies to implement rules and regulations for CCS;
• CO 2 should be regulated as a resource rather than a waste or pollutant to allow beneficial uses; º As part of this paradigm, IOGCC emphasizes that CCS is an economic solution rather than just a regulatory necessity;
º But, IOGCC also recommends a cradle to grave regulatory framework for CCS, much like that used for hazardous waste by EPA;
• Control of long-term underground carbon storage rights should be a required part of site licensing for CCS and be under state control;
• Long-term storage rights should also include eminent domain or unitization powers to allow control of the entire storage reservoir;
• States should develop a two-stage closure process made up of an initial closure period, with liability still attached to the project manager, and a longterm post-closure period, with liability shifting to a state trust; º States must have the power to implement needed monitoring, verification, and remediation regulations in the post-closure phase;
• States, rather than EPA, should regulate the postoperational phase of storage .
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With its main goal of protecting property rights, the IOGCC advocates maintaining the status quo for regulation of CO 2 injections for EOR, which means the right to inject CO 2 is a property right, governed by the oil and gas lease . Only when active oil production has ceased and injection is for the distinct purpose of long-term storage would storage rights move into new regulatory territory . The IOGCC recommends the state enter at this point to control long-term storage . If underground storage is a property right and carbon is a resource rather than a waste product, state laws and lease interpretations are the logical legal pathways for regulation .
While the IOGCC is not focused on combating climate change, it raises important federalism issues that should be considered in any approach to regulating CO 2 and underground storage . However, issues of patchwork regulations, financing, developing infrastructure, freeriders and costsharing, business migration, and environmental justice 68 . Id . at 10-12 .
involve interstate issues that would benefit from a regional or national approach . The three programs discussed below are attempting to affect and control climate change from a regional perspective . But before discussing the individual programs, initial collaborative efforts between the three programs are introduced .
B. Regional Programs-Three-Regions Collaborative Process
There is speculation that because federal legislation seems to have stalled, the three regional programs will link together to pressure and incentivize other states to adopt climate change strategies . 69 Collaboration between the three regional programs, however, has been limited . A white paper on offsets has been developed that provides common definitions and review processes . 70 It defines offsets and lays out minimum requirements an offset must meet to qualify for allowance credit under any of the three regional cap-and-trade programs . According to the document, an offset is "a project-based greenhouse gas emissions reduction or removal that occurs outside the capped emissions sector or sectors regulated by the cap-and-trade program . "
71 To earn allowances for a regulated entity, each offset must meet the outlined standards to show it is real, additional, verifiable, permanent, and enforceable . These requirements and definition bring more clarity to the concept of offsets, which had somewhat different definitions and requirements under the three separate programs .
C. Regional Programs-the RGGI
Ten northeastern and midatlantic states that are part of the RGGI 72 seek to reduce carbon emissions through a cap-andtrade "Budget Trading Program" imposed on the region's fossil-fueled electric-generating facilities that have the capacity to produce 25 MW or more of energy . 73 The program seeks to stabilize CO 2 emissions at 2009 levels until 2014 and then gradually reduce emissions 2 . 5% per year to reach a 10% reduction by 2018 . 74 On December 20, 2005, the RGGI became the first mandatory regional GHG program . 75 The RGGI program does not attempt to regulate GHGs other than CO 2 , although it allows offset projects for methane and sulfur hexafloride . The RGGI is implemented 69 83 Each regulated electric power plant received a cap and must hold enough allowances to cover its emissions . The states retain at least 25% of their total allowances to sell to power plants and use the money for programs that promote energy efficiency, energy conservation, or to provide rebates to consumers . These goals were seen as relatively modest when the program began, and since they were set, a nationwide recession and falling natural gas prices have already led to a 34% reduction in regional emissions . Thus, under the current cap goals, most sources will reach their final reduction goals without having to make any additional changes . 84 The RGGI Model Rule allows emission sources to invest in CO 2 offset projects and deduct the resulting sequestered or avoided CO 2 from their total emissions for the year . 85 While the definition and regulation of offsets has been updated by the Tri-Regional white paper, the Model Rule provides more specific guidelines for the amount and type of offsets regulated entities can use . Power plants may offset up to 3 .3% of their GHG emissions . 86 However, the Model 90 As of December 28, 2010, allowances were available for $1 .86, making the possibility of additional offsets remote . 91 The Model Rule recognizes five offset projects: (1) landfill methane capture and destruction; (2) reduction in emissions of sulfur hexafluoride; (3) sequestration of carbon due to afforestation; (4) reduction or avoidance of CO 2 emissions from natural gas, oil, or propane end-use combustion due to end-use energy efficiency; and (5) avoided methane emissions from agricultural manure management operations . 92 The only sequestration of CO 2 allowed under the RGGI is the biological sequestration of carbon in trees through the afforestation process . The RGGI program does not address geological storage .
The RGGI program was challenged in New York by a natural gas-fired cogeneration plant, seeking to overturn the state's regulations that implement the RGGI . 93 The lawsuit claimed the RGGI violated the Compact Clause of the U .S . Constitution, and that the cap-and-trade program was an impermissible tax that was not authorized by the state legislature . However, the major concern of the litigant was that it would not be able to pass the cost on to the buyer of its electricity as other providers could, because it has a long-term fixed price contract with Consolidated Edison (Con Edison) . 94 The parties reached a settlement agreement in December 2009, which preserved New York's participation in the RGGI by negotiating a way for Indeck Corinth to recover the costs of CO 2 allowances .
Under the terms of the settlement, Con Edison will pay the cogeneration plants for costs they incur in purchasing CO 2 emissions allowances at RGGI auctions . The state, in turn, will essentially reimburse Con Edison by making about $2 .6 million in annual investments in the company's infrastructure and smart grid technologies . 95 Thus, the court never ruled on the constitutional legitimacy of the RGGI, but the cogeneration plant is participating in the cap-and-trade program through concessions from the state and its electricity purchaser .
RGGI CO 2 auctions produced $729 million in nine auctions over two years . According to regulatory docu- ments, and about two-thirds of the money should be invested in energy-efficiency and alternative-energy technologies, which would reduce the need for CCS . However, in 2009, both New Jersey and New York used $155 million from these funds to reduce their deficits, and despite specific funding requirements in RGGI documents, it does not appear that the RGGI has any legal authority over how states use their funds . 96 The clearing price for allowances sold in the June 2010 auction was $1 .86, down from the initial price of $3 .07 and a high of $3 . 51 in March 2009 . Ninety-two percent of the allowances for immediate use and all the allowances for use after 2013 were purchased by electric power generators . 97 After the recession lowered demand for electricity, sales of allowances went down 33% from 2005 compared to 2009 . Besides the recession, lower demand for electricity was attributed to increased use of nuclear and wind-generated power, and fuel-switching due to lower natural gas prices . 98 The market for allowances has collapsed, and the Chicago Climate Exchange ended GHG allowance trading at the end of 2010 .
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D. Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGA)
On November 15, 2007, nine governors of midwestern states and the Premier of Manitoba signed the MGGA .
100
The states now participating are Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, as well as Manitoba . Indiana, Ohio, and Ontario are participating as observers . Nebraska and North Dakota are cooperating with the Accord states in regional initiatives to address climate change . The MGGA states seek to reduce GHG emissions through a regional cap-and-trade system and complementary policies that encourage regional development of renewable energy, energy efficiency, biofuels, and carbon capture and storage . 101 In addition, the MGGA has established GHG reduction targets and time frames consistent with member states' targets . It has also established tracking, management, and crediting systems, and more than any other regional group, MGGA has embraced CCS as an important and effective regional resource for 96 To fulfill the carbon sequestration objective, the MGA Platform seeks as a key strategy to "(a)ccelerate the commercialization of advanced coal and natural gas technologies and infrastructure for the capture and geologic storage of CO 2 emissions, including for enhanced oil and gas recovery . "
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The MGA Platform enumerates specific goals and measures, and a "Cooperative Regional Initiative" specifies how member states are to achieve their carbon sequestration goals . 107 In fulfillment of one of these goals, the MGA released a regulatory "Toolkit" in 2009, providing a regulatory framework to enable permanent geologic storage and clear direction to allow for CO 2 capture, injection, monitoring, verification, and compliance, and address liability for stored CO 2 . 108 The MGA Toolkit suggests statutory and regulatory actions states can take to promote CCS, broken down by issues related to transport, ownership, and liability and financial responsibility . The Toolkit is based on the IOGCC's regulatory framework and World Resources Institute CCS guidelines, as well as a regional survey of state statutes and regulations . Key markers for the MGA Platform include siting and permitting for a multijurisdictional pipeline by 2012 to transport CO 2 from power plants to a reservoir for use in enhanced oil and gas recovery . By 2012, the region should also have at least one commercial-scale 102 IGCC power plant using bituminous coal that uses CCS . By 2015, the region plans to have three or more commercialscale IGCC plants with CCS that use bituminous coal, at least one IGCC plant with CCS that uses sub-bituminous coal, at least one plant with CCS that uses lignite coal, and one or more pulverized coal plants that use commercialscale post-combustion CO 2 capture of emissions . By 2020, all new coal gasification and coal-combustion plants are to capture and store CO 2 emissions, and by 2050, the region's fleet of coal plants will have transitioned to CCS . 109 A 2009 Roadmap laid out four priorities for regional development of advanced coal and CCS . 110 The first priority, to develop a legal and regulatory framework for CCS, was fulfilled by release of the Toolkit and Inventory . States may now modify Toolkit models to fit their own situations . The second priority is to lay the groundwork for a Geologic Storage Utility . A Geologic Storage Utility would serve some of the same functions as the IOGCC state trust discussed above, such as taking long-term responsibility for stored CO 2 and assuring that an entire storage reservoir is under a single managing entity . But the MGA plan envisions an even broader role .
Such a utility could facilitate the development of the commercial CCS industry in the region by taking responsibility for the planning, development, financing, management and long-term site stewardship associated with multiple projects developed in storage formations such as deep saline formations that may cross jurisdictional boundaries . Centralized coordination of such projects would reduce the complexity of managing multiple geologic storage projects in the same geologic formation and provide certainty and transparency to accelerate scale-up of the industry .
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The MGA Commercial Plan also identifies establishment of a Geologic Storage Utility as an important assurance for CCS developers, because it will provide a "more stable and predictable environment" as well as relieving long-term liability concerns .
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The Roadmap's third CCS priority is to use the longterm experience and commercial nature of EOR to incentivize CO 2 storage . Both the Roadmap and Commercial Plan emphasize EOR as the best pathway to develop the necessary technology, funding, and legal framework for large-scale, commercial CCS . 113 The Natural Resources Defense Council also sees the integration of CCS and EOR as a positive development for reducing GHGs: "CO 2 -EOR has a substantial immediate to long-term role to play in both increasing domestic oil production in a responsible way, and in sequestering CO 2 underground . Policies that incentivize the capture of industrial CO 2 can help the country access an untapped domestic oil resource while reducing global warming pollution . "
114
The MGA Platform recommends that states and industry assist existing small to medium oil and gas producers in finding EOR methods that are cost effective . 115 States should support comprehensive assessments of geologic reservoirs at the state and federal levels to determine the CO 2 storage potential and feasibility . The Commercial Plan outlines two phases to expand CCS commercially: Phase I (through 2015) develops commercial-scale capture projects and associated infrastructure related to EOR projects in Kansas, Manitoba, Michigan, Missouri, and North Dakota . It also develops a CO 2 pipeline to connect capture projects in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio to Gulf Coast EOR projects . Phase II (2015-2025) expands the pipeline network and connects all midwestern jurisdictions by pipeline, so that states lacking geologic storage capacity can still capture CO 2 and transport it to other midwestern states for storage . 116 The MGA recommends funding largescale geologic storage tests to assist in developing commercial storage capability . 117 Member states can evaluate the feasibility of CO 2 transport and advanced sequestration to assist jurisdictions without geologic storage potential . 118 The Roadmap's fourth priority is to reduce capital costs of CCS projects and pipelines . The MGA Platform provides suggestions for financial and regulatory incentives to build advanced coal-generation projects with CCS . 119 For example, states should enact state tax incentives for front-ended engineering and design studies for power plant costs . 120 States should match the Energy Policy Act of 2005 plant development incentives and should assure cost recovery for approved advanced coal projects that use CCS technology . 121 States should encourage low-CO 2 coal technologies and modify state policies and regulatory programs to favor advanced-generation technologies that limit CO 2 emissions and use CCS to replace conventional pulverized coal units . 122 The MGA Platform lists several specific means to achieve this goal, including, inter alia, requiring a low-carbon electricity portfolio standard, a CCS portfolio standard, and market-based regulatory programs to encourage investment in low-carbon technologies . 123 It also advocates incentives for deployment of innovative coal gasification technologies, including co-gasification of biomass and underground coal gasification, and the utilization of captured CO 2 . industrial combustion sources, and the final blender or distributor of transportation or other residential, commercial, or industrial combustion fuels ("covered sectors") are the regulatory targets . 133 Entities with annual emissions greater than 25,000 metric tons, calculated on a three-year rolling average, will be subject to the program . If emissions from any source drop below 25,000 metric tons for a threeyear period, that source can apply for exemption from the program . 134 Electric units generating less than 25 MW of energy or that are fueled using 100% biomass are exempt from regulation . Entities in the covered sectors producing more than an annual equivalent of 20,000 metric tons of CO 2 must begin collecting GHG emission data in January 2010, and begin reporting emissions to the Climate Registry Information System 135 in 2011 . 136 The MGGA is to become effective January 2012 . 137 Each participating jurisdiction 138 is responsible for implementing, regulating, and enforcing the provisions of the MGGA's cap-and-trade program and must create an accounting system for allowances and/or offsets . 139 Each regulated entity will demonstrate compliance by surrendering allowances matching their emissions to the appropriate state regulatory agency 140 or surrender penalty allowances or pay a fee for every metric ton of CO 2 equivalent (CO 2 e) not accounted for . 141 States may also levy additional penalties and fees .
142 Regulated entities will make public all 130 132 . For electricity produced and sold within a participating jurisdiction, the first deliverer is the generator of the electricity; for electricity generated outside a jurisdiction but sold inside a participating jurisdiction, the first deliverer is the entity that first delivers the electricity into the participating jurisdiction . emission records that are not subject to confidentiality . 143 The Final Recommendations also recommend that each jurisdiction establish market oversight rules to promote sound markets and prevent fraud . 144 These rules should be "a flexible and adaptive cost containment framework that includes a desired trading price range," stability, avoidance of market failure triggers, and "orderly operation of the allowance trading market . "
145 The Final Recommendations also recommend linking the MGGA to other GHG reduction programs, including the RGGI, the Western Climate Initiative, and the European Emission Trading System . 146 The Final Recommendations recommend dividing the regional cap between participating states based primarily on their relative emissions . 147 However, the Final Recommendations also provide room for some of the allowance budget to be apportioned using other criteria, like emissions per capita, population and economic growth, or new and projected emission sources . 148 Proceeds from allowances are to be used solely for climate change purposes . 149 Funds should be used for: (1) accelerating transformational investments, like the IGCC, CCS, and low-carbon technologies recognized in the MGA Platform; (2) mitigating transitional adverse impacts of the program; and (3) addressing harmful impacts due to climate change . 150 The MGGA envisions each jurisdiction deciding how and whether to allocate or auction allowances, but the Final Recommendations recommend general and specific allowance distribution mechanisms . On the general side, it is recommended that each participating jurisdiction: (1) annually place 2% of their allowances in a reserve pool for cost containment to prevent excessively high or low allowance prices 151 ; (2) enact strong legal mechanisms safeguarding allowance value, ensuring that allowance profits are used for climate purposes, that the distribution is transparent, and that market manipulation and speculation are minimized 152 ; and (3) create mechanisms that prevent windfall profits . 153 On the more specific side, the Final Recommendations recommend a hybrid distribution method that would, for the first three-year compliance period, auction some of the allowances and allocate the rest . 154 Under this method, a set percentage of the total regional allowances, a suggested 5%, would be auctioned regionally and the proceeds directed to regional programs, like the Low-Carbon 143 . Id ate binding legal obligations . The parties expect the WCI program to be self-enforcing, because its members benefit from mutual collaboration as a method of improving each state's individual GHG control efforts . The WCI set an overall regional goal to reduce GHG emissions to 2005 levels by 2020, which is about a 15% reduction . Each member must voluntarily establish a program to reach the reduction goal that includes controls on stationary and mobile sources . The WCI has designed a market-based cap-andtrade program to achieve the regional reduction goal . As with all WCI initiatives, member participation is discretionary, and at this point, only California is committed to begin on the program start date of January 1, 2012 . The WCI agreement does not provide specific goals, but its aim is to have both independent and collaborative efforts by the participating states to develop a regional approach while still respecting "the interests, needs, and circumstances of each jurisdiction . "
162 Although it touts the benefits of a cap-and-trade program with a broad scope and geographic coverage, the WCI is willing to accommodate "alternative schedules for implementation . "
163
On July 27, 2010, the WCI released its Design for WCI Regional Cap-and-Trade Program, which is modeled after existing cap-and-trade plans, such as the RGGI, ERA's Acid Rain Program, and the United Kingdom's Emissions Trading Scheme . 164 The WCI will require allowances for any source with emissions greater than 25,000 metric tons per year . It will also require allowances for deliverers of electricity that generate more than 25,000 metric tons per year to produce the delivered energy, and for any fossil fuel supplier within the jurisdiction whose sold fuel in the jurisdiction would emit 25,000 metric tons or more when combusted . 165 The cap-and-trade program will be implemented in two phases: Phase I starts in 2012, and will cover emissions from electricity, electricity imports, industrial combustion at large sources, and industrial process emissions for which adequate measurement methods exist . Phase II will begin in 2015, and will expand to include transportation fuels and residential, commercial, and industrial fuels not covered in the first phase .
The WCI plan has the broadest scope for targeted sources of the three regional programs . The WCI reasons that the more sources covered by the program, the more opportunities there are for reductions, which should improve program efficiency and reduce compliance costs . The WCI is also developing "complementary policies" outside of the cap-and-trade program to further reduce emissions . The most comprehensive policy is to set Low Carbon Fuel Standards (LCFS) for vehicles . This has already been 162 Technology Commercialization Fund . 155 Complementing the regional auction, it is recommended that jurisdictions attach a modest fee to the remaining allowances and allocate them between the transportation, utility, merchant power, and industrial sectors in proportion to their GHG emissions, without discriminating against combined heat and power . It is also recommended that all allowances for the industrial sector be allocated rather than auctioned for the first two compliance periods, and then gradually transitioned to full action in line with all the other allowances . 156 The Final Recommendations suggest that after the initial three compliance periods, the states transition to a full auction system . 157 Like the Tri-Regional Offset recommendations, the MGGA Final Recommendations suggest that each jurisdiction develop a carbon offset program that is "real, additional, verifiable, permanent, and enforceable . "
158 To make these programs effective, offsets should be regionally reviewed and approved . Material on offset protocols and criteria that was present in the draft of the Final Recommendations was removed from the final version . The Tri-Regional Offsets white paper was produced during this time, and it contains information on offset protocols and criteria that has now been adopted by the MGGA . 159 Collaboration with the other regions on offsets furthers MGGA's goal outlined in the draft materials to standardize offset protocols and criteria as much as possible .
The The WCI program also has the broadest definition of regulated emissions . It will cover emissions of CO 2 , methane, nitrous oxide, nitrogen tri-fluoride, perfluorocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride, in contrast to the RGGI program that covers only CO 2 from the electric power sector . In the first compliance period, about 50% of GHG emissions will be regulated, and in the second period, beginning in 2015, about 90% of the emissions will be regulated . Transportation fuels are the largest source of GHG emissions in the WCI region, although this differs from state to state and province to province .
Although the cap-and-trade program will only be required for sources with annual potential emissions of 25,000 metric tons of CO 2 e or more, WCI Partner jurisdictions will require entities and facilities with annual emissions equal to or greater than 10,000 metric tons of CO 2 e to report their emissions . California data show the participation and reporting requirements will cover about 94% of the emissions from stationary sources . Although small sources will not be regulated to reduce the costs of administration and to keep the costs of allowances below a projected $25 through 2020, the WCI will most likely regulate small oil and gas sources that can be aggregated by ownership . Decisions are currently being negotiated as to the level of aggregation (field, basin, or jurisdiction) and the reporting threshold (10,000, 25,000, lower, or higher) required to reach the WCI goal to cover a significant portion of emissions with as few facilities and reporting entities as possible . 167 The WCI is also harmonizing its reporting requirements to align with the new EPA GHG reporting requirements that will go into effect in 2011 . 168 Each WCI Partner jurisdiction will calculate its own preliminary annual allowance budget, based on its projected emissions for covered sources in 2012 . Estimates should account for new and shutdown sources, as well as voluntary and mandatory emission reductions through 2012 . Each jurisdiction should also propose a target rate of decline (ROD) for each year in the compliance period . This preliminary allowance and ROD will be reviewed by the WCI committee for Cap Setting and Allowance Distribution (CSAD), after which the Partner jurisdiction may make recommended changes at its discretion . It is ultimately up to each individual Partner jurisdiction, working in partnership with other jurisdictions and with input from 166 the CSAD committee, to arrive at its own allowance budget and ROD . 169 The WCI recommends that each jurisdiction distribute enough allowances to cover expected emissions for the first year of each compliance period in 2012 and 2015 to ease the transition into the program . 170 There will be an upward adjustment for allowances in 2015, and thereafter, to account for the addition of transportation, residential, and commercial fuels to the cap-and-trade program . The western states and Canadian provinces will each have an emissions reduction goal, but are free to impose greater reduction requirements .
While the WCI cap-and-trade program encourages consistency among Partner jurisdictions, because it is actually a collection of individual state and provincial auctions that are only joined through recognition of other jurisdictions' allowances, it leaves jurisdictions the most discretion to set and distribute allowances, apply offsets, and decide how funds are used of any of the three regional programs . Each WCI Partner jurisdiction will decide how to distribute its allowances to the regulated sources . However, the WCI is developing some mechanisms to prevent leakage of emissions from one Partner jurisdiction to another or from the WCI region to nonregulated regions . For the first compliance period, the WCI recommends a minimum of 10% of the allowance budget be auctioned, increasing to 25% in 2020 . 171 The WCI aspires to have a higher percentage of the allowances auctioned, but is concerned over the economic impacts of auctions on industries with competitors not subject to GHG emission controls . The WCI encourages Partner jurisdictions to identify energyintensive, trade-exposed (EITE) industries that are particularly vulnerable to outside competition and leakage, and suggests that EITEs be given free distribution allowances and benchmarked to keep them competitive with outside providers . 172 For electricity providers outside of the WCI region, the WCI recommends requiring allowances from the First Jurisdictional Deliverer (FJD) to prevent leakage and unfair competition for electricity providers within the WCI . 173 The money received from auctioned allowances is subject to some general guidance aimed at encouraging GHG reductions, but the Partner jurisdictions have the discretion to use the money as they wish . Once an allowance is obtained, it does not expire, and can be banked . But, if a source has excess emissions, it cannot borrow allowances from future distributions . If a covered entity or facility does not have sufficient allowances to cover its emissions at the end of its compliance period, it will be required to surrender three allowances for every excess metric ton of CO 2 e in excess of its compliance obligation within three 169 months after the end of the compliance period . There are no other regional penalties in the WCI Design; instead, each jurisdiction is expected to use its authority to enforce compliance . Because some level of harmonization in stringency and enforcement is necessary, the WCI strongly recommends that all jurisdictions punish excess emissions by requiring one allowance for each ton of excess, plus three additional allowances . 174 On May 8, 2009, the WCI proposed mandatory reporting requirements for facilities subject to the emissions trading program that are more comprehensive than EPA's reporting requirements . 175 Many energy companies that operate in the West oppose this proposal, 176 but Washington has already proposed rulemaking to implement it . 177 The WCI also proposes creation of a regional administrative organization to coordinate the regional auction of allowances; tracking emissions and providing public information; reporting on market activity; updates between Partner jurisdictions; and review and adoption of protocols and offsets . 178 An important part of the WCI cap-and-trade program involves offsets . Following the tri-regional approach to defining offsets, the WCI allows the most generous use of offsets of the three regional programs to achieve GHG reductions, reduce compliance costs and encourage technological innovation . The WCI will reward offset certificates to the sponsor of a GHG emissions offset project . A WCI offset certificate is awarded for: "a reduction or removal of one metric ton of CO 2 e (tCO 2 e) . Reductions and removals must be clearly owned, adhere to recommended protocols, and result from a project located in a qualifying geographic area . "
179 Offsets are achieved through activities that are often referred to as "offset projects . " Offset certificates will be accepted as allowances, subject to limitations (currently recommended as less than 49% of a source's total emissions), and can be used for compliance purposes or as part of voluntary actions . When used within a cap-and-trade program, "offset certificates used for compliance purposes must come from emission sources or sinks not covered by the cap . " 180 Each Partner jurisdiction is authorized to issue offset credits for approved GHG reduction projects located in North America . Each Partner jurisdiction must accept offset certificates from other Partner jurisdictions and may elect to accept offset certificates from outside North America if it 174 . WCI Design, supra note 163, at DD-37, §7 .2 . 5 so chooses . This would allow credits from developing countries, such as those based on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, to be accepted . 181 The WCI has recommended that offsets be used for no more than 49% of total emission reductions, though individual Partner jurisdictions may establish a lower percentage limit if they see fit . 182 Before approving offset projects, Partner jurisdictions are responsible for transparently establishing criteria "such that sufficient and appropriate protocol, project and certificate information is disclosed in a timely manner to allow offset system participants and the general public to make decisions with reasonable confidence . "
183 WCI offsets are based on the same criteria as the tri-regional offsets recommendations: real, additional, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable . Partner jurisdictions are responsible to enforce local offset projects by putting sufficient compliance and enforcement mechanisms in place to compel compliance and verify that offsets actually reduce, remove, or avoid GHGs . 184 Projects within WCI jurisdictions that meet WCI criteria must be recognized by all jurisdictions, regardless of the jurisdiction of origin . 185 Though development of offset projects within WCI jurisdictions is highly encouraged, 186 Partner jurisdictions may also accept offset projects throughout Canada, Mexico, and the United States if projects are subject to comparable rigorous oversight, validation, verification, and enforcement actions . 187 Partner jurisdictions may require additional criteria for CDM projects to guarantee they meet the WCI's offset project standards . 188 The WCI is currently working on Offset Process Draft Recommendations that will detail more specific requirements for registration, validation, monitoring, quantification, reporting, verification, certification, and issuance of offsets . 189 In response to the Design Recommendations' call for further review of priority offset protocols, the WCI has begun protocol development to ease regionwide use of three types of offset projects: Agriculture (soil sequestration and manure management); Forestry (afforestation/ reforestation, forest management, forest preservation/conservation, forest products); and waste management (landfill gas and wastewater management) . The explanation for the "permanent" requirement for offsets also mentions sequestration of carbon, although it does not differentiate between geological or biological sequestration . In order for sequestration to qualify for offset status, it should achieve the same atmospheric effect as non-sequestration projects, which is based on the international standard developed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (currently 100 years) . 193 However, the Offset Protocol document does not specifically address or mention CCS or related technology .
While the WCI is progressing in documenting its program design and developing policies to complement its cap-and-trade program, a review of how proposals have developed through the collaborative process of the WCI shows that definitive regional control or specific limitations for Partner jurisdictions have been softened or removed from final documents . The WCI seems to be moving away from policies that could be construed as centralizing control in the WCI . For example, the emphasis on a regionwide cap set forth in the Design Recommendations changed to emphasize only individual jurisdictional caps in the Final Design document . The Design Recommendations set forth guidance for the WCI to apportion allowances based on Partner jurisdiction emissions limits . 194 The Final Design document makes no mention of regional apportionment, and instead emphasizes only regional consultations: "Although developed in a regionally-coordinated manner through these guidelines, each Partner jurisdiction will determine and adopt its own budget . Each Partner jurisdiction will also determine how allowances within its budget will be distributed (e .g ., to address competitiveness and leakage issues) . "
195 The regional administrative organization described in the Design Recommendations is not mentioned in the Final Design and seems to be replaced by a Program Authority in each Partner jurisdiction, which will administer the program based on recommended standards and discretionary avenues of regional coordination . 196 For the WCI program to become a reality, member states and provinces must enact the necessary implementation legislation . In the political climate after 2010 midterm elections, there is great uncertainty as to whether the disparate interests of the western states can lead to a uniform regional approach . 197 The governors of California, 198 California's 2006 global warming law, AB 32, which calls for a reduction of GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 (more stringent than the WCI) is also politically vulnerable . California is being sued by environmentalists, who claim California's regulations are not as stringent as the law requires, 199 while industry proponents managed to put the law on a ballot initiative in the November election that could have essentially killed the bill . 200 While the AB 32 ballot initiative was defeated, another ballot initiative (Proposition 26) will likely be used by opponents to challenge AB 32 in court . 201 As of early 2011, California is the only WCI member state that is moving to implement a cap-and-trade program . The Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec also may approve a cap-and-trade program or a functional equivalent to begin in 2012 . 202 
III. State CCS Efforts
A. State Property Law and CCS
In the United States, the right to use underground reservoirs and the associated pore space for storage is considered to belong to the surface owner, unless those rights have been legally transferred to another person or entity . 203 However, those with mineral rights have the right to reasonable use of pore spaces as needed to capture minerals . 204 State law generally governs property issues except on federal lands . State laws vary, and much of the law is based on case law that has developed from conflicts over oil and gas contracts or lease provisions . The generally accepted interpretation of oil and gas leases is that any property right not explicitly conveyed is retained by the grantor, usually the surface owner . 205 For this reason, the decisions are often based on the language of the documents in dispute . For example in Mapco v. Carter, 206 a Texas district court ruled the mineral owner's rights prevailed over the surface owner's rights, because the natural gas was being stored in a cavern formed only by removing the mineral in question-salt-and the lease reserved all minerals to the mineral owner . Almost all other cases have held that the pore space belongs to the surface owner . 207 Most states follow "the American Rule" that after subsurface minerals have been removed, the surface owner owns the depleted space . 208 A minority of states follow "the English Rule," such as Kentucky and Texas, which allows the mineral owner to continue to own the pore space after all minerals have been extracted . 209 This approach creates uncertainty, because it is not easy to determine when the reservoir has been depleted . The age of the case law on this subject, its focus on oil and gas law, and its fact-dependency make the precedent of marginal value, and several authors have recently called the majority/minority interpretation into question . 210 Case law does demonstrate the need for certainty in this field if large-scale CCS development is to occur . It would be best if ownership rights were clarified through legislation to avoid the need for CCS operators to obtain approval (with the associated costs and potential for litigation) from the holders of all potential property interests on a case-by-case basis .
Bills are pending in both the House and the Senate that would designate pore space as belonging to the surface owner for federal lands . 211 Some states have also begun the process of specifying pore space ownership through legislation . In Wyoming, pore spaces were declared to be the property of the surface owner . 212 interpretations of property rights and provides that, unless otherwise discernable from deeds or severance documents, ownership of storage reservoirs will be presumed to attach to surface ownership . 213 However, mineral owners still have the right to drill around or through pore space owned by the surface owner, as long as they meet certain state safety requirements . 214 After completion of the project and 15 years of monitoring, the CCS facility owner may transfer ownership and liability to the state if specific conditions are met . 215 Other states seem to follow the recommendation of the IOGCC and designate the CCS facility owner as the owner of any CO 2 injected for the purpose of sequestration without explicitly designating pore space ownership . 216 Because of the variation in the details of state CCS regulatory programs, there have been attempts to bring some consistency to the process . In 2007, the IOGCC issued a model program based on existing oil and gas regulatory programs that includes model statutes and regulations to help states develop legal mechanisms encouraging the use of CCS . The IOGCC guidance covers both property law and liability issues . 217 The IOGCC believes it is essential for the storage project to be controlled by the operator of the sequestration project, regardless of who owns the pore space . This necessitates acquisition of the necessary property interests from the landowner, and possibly mineral owners .
As states develop geological sequestration programs, they will also face constitutionally based challenges concerning the extent to which an owner of the surface or subsurface estate can control areas deep below ground . If subsurface pore space is used for sequestration by state governments, will surface or subsurface owners have a cause of action for a physical or regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment for which compensation would need to be paid? These issues have been covered in a seminal article by Profs . Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson, and will only be lightly treated in this Article . 218 Until the advent of air travel, ownership of land extended to the sky and to the center of the earth . But in 1946, the U .S . Supreme Court declared the air to be a public highway . 219 No similar decision has been made concerning sub- surface rights, which have been subject to an extensive body of property laws designed to protect owners of land . 220 In 1982, the Supreme Court made it clear that the government's physical occupation of land is a taking for which compensation is required . 221 However, the Court has never ruled whether land far beneath the surface belongs to those holding property interests in the surface land, although a significant body of relevant state law has developed regarding oil and gas development, underground waste injection, and natural gas storage . 222 Natural gas storage was the subject of congressional action in the Natural Gas Act that implicitly recognizes a property interest in the use of land for subsurface storage of natural gas, and this property right is subject to the power of eminent domain . 223 The law of damages for adverse impacts on land from oil and gas secondary recovery is usually based on state statutes governing the petroleum industry, but the absolute ownership doctrine (defining land ownership as extending to the periphery of the universe) is usually rejected . 224 Waste-injection cases, in which surface owners seek recovery for damages to their property caused by deep well-injection, usually require plaintiffs to prove harm to actual use of the subsurface . 225 This led Professors Klass and Wilson to conclude that the law is not clear, and courts that face carbon sequestration takings issues have options ranging from recognizing property rights in pore space only when actual harm to the pore space itself or ongoing economic uses occurs, to recognizing a property interest in subsurface pore space, regardless of use or reasonably foreseeable use . However, even if an absolute right to the pore space is recognized, the amount of compensation provided in such cases will determine the importance of an absolute right . 226 Prof . John Sprankling argues that private property rights to land should not extend more than 1,000 feet down, and pore space below that depth should be publicly owned . 227 Professor Sprankling's suggested cutoff depth is probably unrealistic, given the depth at which oil and gas and other mineral industries now work, sometimes far in excess of 1,000 feet . A better approach, according to Professors Klass and Wilson, is to pass legislation authorizing deep subsurface carbon sequestration that terminates private subsurface property interests except for uses already being made or uses that are based on reasonable investment-backed expectations . 228 A per se regulatory taking occurs if a landowner is deprived of all reasonable, beneficial use, even in the absence of any physical taking . However, based on Lucas 220 . Klass 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
229 even if all economic use of the property is denied by a regulation, it may not be a per se regulatory taking if the restriction is based on the law of nuisance . This holding makes it even more difficult to prove a regulatory taking occurred . 230 If a property has some economic value remaining, the balancing test found in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v , New York City 231 will be used to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred . The application of the balancing tests in a carbon sequestration case will be affected by whether courts consider the pore space to be an independent property right that can be considered separately from the use of the entire property . Even if a taking is established, a property owner is required to show its losses in order to be eligible for federal economic assistance . 232 For most properties, this mandate will limit potential claimants .
Additional problems are created if the subsurface estate is held by more than one entity . For example, ownership issues have arisen in coal-bed methane (CBM) controversies, where the issue is whether the coal owner or the natural gas owner has the right to extract CBM . The American Rule is that CBM belongs to the natural gas owner, not the coal owner . 233 If the title to the pore space is held by the surface owner, and coal underlying a tract of land has been severed from the other mineral interests, what are the rights of those owning part of the subsurface estate? One effort to deal with split estate issues is found in the Wyoming Surface Owner Accommodation Act that provides protection for surface owners from surface activities of the subsurface owners . 234 A similar approach may be needed to protect subsurface interests if the surface owner allows geological sequestration to occur .
B. State CCS Permits
In December 2010, EPA finalized federal rules for underground injection of CO 2 for purposes of geological storage (GS) (UIC Rules) . 235 With the release of the EPA's final rule covering CO 2 injection underground for storage purposes, there is both more surety for CCS projects and less discretion for state control of CCS . Operators of all CCS projects will now need an operating permit from either the state where the project is located or from EPA . The permitting authority will require detailed engineering and geological data that demonstrate the suitability of the site for long-term carbon sequestration . The size of the project area that will be monitored and reviewed will also be defined by the permitting authority . The UIC Rules are promul-gated under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 236 and establish a new category of injection wells, Class VI, that covers underground injection for the purpose of geologic storage of CO 2 . The UIC Rules require owners or operators of Class VI wells to perform a detailed assessment of the geologic, hydrogeologic, geochemical, and geomechanical properties of the proposed GS site to ensure that GS wells are sited in appropriate locations and inject into suitable formations . Class VI well owners or operators must also identify additional confining zones, if required by the Director, to increase protection for underground sources of drinking water . Owners or operators must submit, with their permit applications, a series of comprehensive site-specific plans: An area of review (AoR) and corrective action plan; a monitoring and testing plan; an injection well-plugging plan; a post-injection site care (PISC) and site-closure plan; and an emergency and remedial response plan . The requirement for a comprehensive series of sitespecific plans is new to the UIC program . 237 Under SDWA §1421(b), the UIC Rules mandate that EPA develop minimum federal requirements that a state must meet to achieve UIC primary enforcement responsibility, or primacy, to ensure protection of underground sources of drinking water (USDW) . If states want to implement the UIC program, they must apply to EPA for primacy approval . In the primacy application, states must demonstrate: (1) state jurisdiction over underground injection projects; (2) that their state regulations are at least as stringent as those promulgated by EPA (e .g ., permitting, inspection, operation, monitoring, and recordkeeping requirements); and (3) that the state has the necessary administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement penalty remedies pursuant to 40 C .F .R . §145 . 13 . EPA will directly implement the UIC program for states that do not apply for primacy and for states that only have primacy for part of the UIC program . 238 EPA will allow states to achieve independent primacy for Class VI wells, under §145 . 1(i) of the final rule, and will accept applications from states for independent primacy under §1422 of the SDWA for managing UIC storage projects under Class VI . EPA's willingness to accept independent primacy applications for Class VI wells applies only to Class VI well primacy, and does not apply to any other well class under SDWA §1422 (i .e ., I, III, IV, and V) . States will have 270 days following EPA's final promulgation of the geologic storage rule on September 6, 2011, to submit a complete primacy application that meets the requirements of § §145 .22 or 145 .32 .
Section 145 .23(f)(1) requires states with primacy to include a schedule for issuing Class VI permits for wells within the state that require the permits within two years after receiving program approval from EPA, and §145 .23(f) (2) requires states to include their permitting priorities, as well as the number of permits to be issued during the first two years of program operation . State or EPA directors 236 . 42 U .S .C . § §300f to 300j-26, ELR Stat . SDWA § §1401-1465 . 237 . UIC Rules, supra note 235, at 77293 . 238 . Id . at 77241 . must also submit a plan to notify existing owners/operators of Class I wells that have become storage sites or Class V experimental wells that will now be used for storage that they must apply for a Class VI permit to either the state or EPA permitting authority within one year of December 10, 2011 .
Section 146 .82(a)(2) requires the owner or operator of a CCS operation to identify all state, tribal, and territorial boundaries within the AoR . Based on the information provided to the state or EPA Director during the initiation of the permit application, the Director, pursuant to requirements at §146 .82(b), must provide written notification to all states, tribes, and territories in the AoR to inform them of the permit application and to afford them an opportunity to be involved in any relevant activities (e .g ., development of the emergency and remedial response plan ( §146 . 94)) . Owners or operators must periodically reevaluate the AoR to incorporate monitoring and operational data and to verify that the CO 2 is moving as predicted within the subsurface . The AoR is defined in the final rule as, "the region surrounding the geologic sequestration project where USDWs may be endangered by the injection activity . The AoR is delineated using computational modeling that accounts for the physical and chemical properties of all phases of the injected CO 2 stream and displaced fluids and is based on available site characterization, monitoring, and operational data as set forth in §146 . 84 . " EPA is developing guidance on AoR and corrective action to support AoR delineation (i .e ., including regions of the CO 2 plume and pressure front) . Under the proposed approach, AoR reevaluation would occur at a minimum of every 10 years during CO 2 injection, or when monitoring data and modeling predictions differ significantly . Periodic AoR reevaluation is an integral component of this approach . EPA believes that the AoR reevaluation is an efficient use of resources and notes that if the CO 2 plume and pressure front are moving as predicted, the burden of the AoR reevaluation requirement will be minimal .
The UIC Rules, at §146 . 91(e), also require that all reports, submittals, and notifications under Subpart H be submitted to EPA in an electronic format . This requirement applies to owners or operators in Class VI primacy states, as well as those in states where EPA implements the Class VI program, pursuant to §147 . 1 . All Directors will have access to the data through the EPA electronic data system .
The information submitted as a demonstration, to the Director, must be in the appropriate format and level of detail necessary to support permitting and project-specific decisions by the Director to ensure USDW protection . The final decision regarding the appropriateness and acceptability of all owner or operator submissions rests with the Director . Owners or operators must submit, pursuant to the requirements at §146 . 91(e), information to the Director to support Class VI permit applications (this information is enumerated at §146 .82) . This information includes: site-characterization information on the stratigraphy, geo-logic structure, and hydrogeologic properties of the site; a demonstration that the applicant has met financial responsibility requirements; proposed construction, operating, and testing procedures; and AoR/corrective action, testing and monitoring, well plugging, PISC and site closure, and emergency and remedial response plans .
Class VI well owners or operators must retain data collected to support permit applications and data on the CO 2 stream until 10 years after site closure . Owners or operators must retain monitoring data collected under the testing and monitoring requirements at §146 . 90(b-i) for 10 years after it is collected . The rule allows the Director authority to require the owner or operator to retain specific operational monitoring data for a longer duration of time ( §146 . 91(f)(5)) . Well-plugging reports, PISC data, and siteclosure reports must be kept for 10 years after site closure ( § §146 . 92(d), 146 . 93(f), and 146 . 93(h)) Section 146 . 92 requires owners or operators of Class VI wells to plug injection and monitoring wells in a manner that protects USDWs . The final rule, at §146 . 93, also contains tailored requirements for extended, comprehensive post-injection monitoring and site care of GS projects following cessation of injection, until it can be demonstrated that movement of the CO 2 plume and pressure front no longer pose a risk of endangerment to USDWs . The owners or operators must prepare and comply with a Directorapproved injection well-plugging plan submitted with their permit application ( §146 . 92(b)) . The approved injection well-plugging plan will be incorporated into the Class VI permit . The Agency is developing guidance that describes the contents of the project plans required in the GS rule, including the injection well-plugging plan .
Upon cessation of injection, the UIC Rules require that owners or operators of Class VI wells either submit an amended PISC and site-closure plan or demonstrate to the Director through monitoring data and modeling results that no amendment to the plan is needed ( §146 . 93(a) (3)) . The Agency is developing guidance that describes the content of the project plans required in the GS rule, including the PISC and site-closure plan . EPA retains the proposed default 50-year PISC time frame . However, the final rule affords flexibility regarding the duration of the PISC time frame by: (1) allowing the Director discretion to shorten or lengthen the PISC time frame during the PISC period based on site-specific data, pursuant to requirements at §146 . 93(b); and (2) affording the Director discretion to approve a Class VI well owner or operator to demonstrate, based on substantial data during the permitting process, that an alternative PISC time frame is appropriate, if it ensures nonendangerment of USDWs pursuant to requirements at §146 . 93(c) . Section 146 . 93(c) provides the Director discretion to approve a demonstration during the permitting process (per requirements at §146 .82(a) (18)) that an alternative PISC time frame, other than the 50-year default, is appropriate .
Following a determination under §146 . 93 that the site no longer poses a risk of endangerment to USDWs, the Director would approve site closure, and the owner or operator would be required to properly close site operations . These site-closure requirements are similar to those for other well classes . These include: plugging all monitoring wells; submitting a site-closure report; and recording a notation on the deed to the facility property or other documents that the land has been used to sequester CO 2 . Site closure would proceed according to the approved PISC and site-closure plan ( §146 . 93(d) through (h)) .
The rule also finalizes regulations at §146 .85 that require owners or operators to demonstrate and maintain financial responsibility, as approved by the Director, for performing corrective action on wells in the AoR, injection well-plugging, PISC and site closure, and emergency and remedial response . Once an owner or operator has met all regulatory requirements under Part 146 for Class VI wells and the Director has approved site closure pursuant to requirements at §146 . 93, the owner or operator will generally no longer be subject to enforcement under §1423 of the SDWA for noncompliance with UIC regulatory requirements . However, an owner or operator may be held liable for regulatory noncompliance under certain circumstances, even after site closure is approved under §146 . 93, or under §1423 of the SDWA for violating §144 . 12, such as where the owner or operator provided erroneous data to support approval of site closure . Additionally, an owner or operator may always be subject to an order the EPA Administrator deems necessary to protect the health of persons under §1431 of the SDWA after site closure, if there is fluid migration that causes or threatens imminent and substantial endangerment to a USDW .
The finalization of these EPA regulations will impact the state CCS controls discussed in this Article . EPA is currently tracking regulatory efforts in 18 states: Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming . EPA is considering this information as it develops guidance on the primacy application and approval process for Class VI wells . States have taken considerable action to regulate, promote, and secure CCS projects throughout the United States .
West Virginia enacted H .B . 2860 on May 4, 2009, to regulate CCS . On the same day, the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection issued an underground injection permit to allow the Appalachian Power Company to inject up to 165,000 metric tons of CO 2 over a four-to five-year period from its Mountaineer Plant . The facilities that are permitted must comply with the Clean Water Act (CAA) 239 and meet West Virginia's new requirements for site monitoring, notice if sequestered CO 2 is released, guidelines for terminating a CCS project, and post-closure . Civil penalties up to $25,000 per day are established for violations of these state requirements . This project will only sequester a small portion of the plant's CO 2 emissions, but it is the first CCS project at an existing facility . 240 Kansas enacted legislation in March 2007 that directs the Kansas Corporation Commission to develop CCS rules . 241 The Kansas rules require well construction standards and a storage permit, but no underground injection permit is required . Kansas law also creates a fund to pay for the costs of regulation, remediation, and monitoring of CCS activities . 242 As more states develop regulatory programs, various issues need to be resolved . What concentration of CO 2 will trigger the applicability of CCS legislation? How much contamination should be allowed in the injected waste stream? How are CO 2 concentrations to be monitored and enforced? How is the appropriateness of the site to be demonstrated? What control over the use of models for risk assessment, site integrity, plume movement, etc ., will be given to the permitting authority? What baseline data will be required, and who will be responsible for developing it? Will health impacts on drinking water be regulated, and will other health impacts be regulated? Are ecosystem impacts, including impacts on wildlife, to be covered? How long must the CO 2 be sequestered? How are the site selection and design of the facility going to achieve that goal? What remedies are available to the state if the CCS facility leaks outside the reservoir or into the atmosphere? How is the reservoir defined so as to determine when CO 2 is not being confined? How is the geologic integrity of the facility to be monitored, and what are the remedies if there is a failure of the containment, including triggering earthquakes, subsidence, or other breaches of the physical integrity of the facility? What other monitoring will be required? What authority will the state have to determine the need for mitigation or remediation of the site, and what authority will it have over implementation of such measures? How long after the injection ends will the operator remain liable? What must the operator show in order to have the state assume long-term responsibility for the site? Under what circumstances can the liability of the operator be revisited? As state permit programs proliferate, an important issue will be whether federal laws will be enacted that preempt or restrict state permit requirements . sure Period and a Post-Closure Period . The Closure Period begins when the injection well is plugged and continues for a specified time . The IOGCC recommends 10 years .
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During the Closure Period, the operator would be responsible for site monitoring and for maintaining a facility bond to assure that resources are available to meet closure obligations . At the end of this defined period, the operator must demonstrate that the well is not releasing CO 2 outside the boundaries of the reservoir or into the atmosphere and that the operation is in compliance with applicable federal and state law . If the state agrees, it would assume the long-term stewardship obligation, and the operator's bond would be released . It would be useful to create an industry-funded trust fund that is administered by the state to assure that money is available to cover the costs of post-closure state management, including monitoring, verification, and any remediation actions that may be required in the future . The money for the trust fund could be generated from a per-ton charge on the CO 2 at the time it is injected .
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D. Renewable Portfolio Requirements
The failure of the federal government to develop a sustainable electrical energy policy has led to state efforts that encourage and discourage the use of fossil fuel to generate electricity . States have created renewable portfolio standards (RPSs), trust funds to encourage renewable energy, and net metering requirements to promote decentralized, distributed energy . 246 On the other hand, some states allow standby service charges on dispersed generators, charge exit fees for customers that depart from centralized electric power providers, and resist transmission infrastructure upgrades that protect existing fossil-fuel generators from competition from new technologies or out-of-state electricity providers . 247 Perhaps the most important of these state actions is the spread of state RPSs that require electric utilities to meet a specified percentage of their electricity sales using renewable resources . In 2010, 36 states and the District of Columbia had RPSs . 248 However, there is little consistency among the state RPS statutes . Iowa, in 1991, was the first state to enact an RPS . Iowa, as well as most states that subsequently enacted RPSs, specified a percentage of electricity that had to be generated from renewable sources . The required standards range from 0 .2 to 33% . 249 New York, for example, requires 25% of the state's power to be gener- ; and Colorado requires 30% by 2020 .
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The renewable percentage and time for compliance of the mandates do not accurately describe the efforts of the state legislatures, however, because the requirements can range from strict mandates to voluntary . 253 Moreover, credit multipliers are used by many states to provide additional subsidies to certain types of renewable resources or to benefit renewable power generated within the state . 254 Some states require a minimum percentage of the power sold in the state to come from renewable energy, which is known as a "bundled" approach . In 2010, only Arizona, California, Illinois, and Iowa were considered to be bundled states . In California, utilities must submit a procurement plan for renewable purchases to the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) . After PUC approval, the utilities must contract for the purchase of renewable electricity and have the PUC approve the contracts . 255 Other states with RPSs use an "unbundled" approach that allows utilities to purchase renewable energy credits (RECs) from electric power generators located anywhere in the country to meet RPS mandates . RECs are tradable commodities, with each REC typically representing one megawatt hour of electricity generated from a renewable source . 256 But the time allowed for the RECs to be used range from one year to unlimited . 257 The variability of the state RPS programs is a constraint on the development of a viable trading system . 258 States, such as California, with renewable portfolio requirements are also discovering the construction of facilities needed to meet RPS will not be met by the imposed deadlines . 259 Moreover, RPS may not produce carbon reductions beyond those that could be achieved with a capand-trade system . It has been argued that cap and trade will achieve the same objective as RPS at a lower cost and will preserve the freedom of the regulated entities to decide how to best comply . 260 But cap and trade faces its own implementation hurdles . Federal efforts at RPS include President Obama's call for 25% of the nation's electric power to be generated from renewables by 2025 . The Waxman-Markey Bill includes a federal renewable portfolio and electricity savings standard starting at 6% in 2012 and increasing to 20% in 2020 . The Waxman-Markey Bill limits the use of energy-efficiency measures to meet the mandate of 40% of the combined renewable electricity and electricity sav- 251 ings requirement . 261 However, as discussed above, federal efforts to enact either cap and trade or RPS legislation in 2010 failed .
Because many states have or are in the process of enacting renewable portfolio requirements, it is important to specify if, and how, CCS will affect such requirements . Will the percentage of renewable energy that is required be based on the electric power generated, or will it be based on the power generated minus production whose emissions are sequestered? How will future leakage of sequestered CO 2 be treated in regards to renewable requirements? Most of the laws are silent as to the effect that CCS will have on RPS requirements . One approach is to consider CCS the equivalent of renewable energy and to issue RECs for CO 2 sequestered that will help meet an RPS requirement . This would mean that CCS would compete with other renewable resources for an electric power generator's capital investment dollars . Another possibility is that CCS would lower the total electric power generated against which the RPS is calculated . This would allow CCS investments to lower RPS requirements . A third possible approach would be to treat CCS as having no effect on RPS requirements . The second approach would appear to be the most desirable approach .
E. Tort Liability
A barrier to the implementation of CCS is the potential liability for mishaps . Injected CO 2 could be released to the atmosphere through undetected faults or abandoned well bores . taken in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Systems Act . 265 There is also a comprehensive financial liability mechanism for dealing with oil spills in the Oil Pollution Act . 266 In the absence of a federal compensation program, traditional tort-and property-based legal remedies would apply . In such cases, it is highly unlikely that a federal common law would be recognized; the state law where the injury occurred would be the applicable law . 267 However, if a comprehensive federal CCS program is created, the defendant in a state tort-based action may or may not be protected if it is in compliance with federal requirements, depending on whether federal law is interpreted as fully preempting state law . 268 Federal law is likely to play an important role in determining the appropriate standard of care or what is reasonable conduct in a state tort action . It has been suggested that for the first dozen CCS projects the government should assume all tort liability in order to spur the development of carbon sequestration . But such an action may have an adverse impact on the selection of safe sites and could encourage risky behavior on the part of operators . 269 A significant case that deals with federal preemption is Roberts v. Florida Power & Light Company . 270 In this 1998 case, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Price-Anderson Act set the standard of care in an action based on negligence and strict liability for radiation injuries to a worker at a nuclear power facility . This was a "public liability action" within the meaning of the Price-Anderson Act . 271 The issue of concern to the Eleventh Circuit was whether Price-Anderson and federal radiation regulations or state tort standards should be used to determine tort liability . The plaintiff made no assertion that the defendant's emissions exceeded the maximum dose allowed by federal law . The Supreme Court had previously ruled that the Price-Anderson Act did not preempt a state award of punitive damages . 272 But since that ruling, Congress barred punitive awards in 1988 amendments to Price-Anderson where the federal government would be liable for them under an indemnification agreement . 273 Price-Anderson says the substantive law in a public liability action shall be derived from state law, unless the law of the state in which the nuclear incident occurred is inconsistent with the provisions of §2210 . The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that federal nuclear regulations establish the exclusive standard of care owed by operators of nuclear power plants to their workers . 274 As succinctly stated by the Seventh Circuit, "state regulation of nuclear safety, through either legislation or negligence actions, is preempted by federal law . " 275 Thus, in the case of nuclear power plants, there has been general agreement among the circuits that federal regulations form the sole duty of care owed by operators of nuclear power plants toward their employees . 276 The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, departed from this clear preemption stance in Cook v. Rockwell International Corporation, 277 a recent decision involving trespass and nuisance claims against a nuclear facility in Colorado . Instead of looking to federal regulations to provide "the sole measure of the defendants' duty," 278 as five other circuit courts have done, 279 the Tenth Circuit held that the 1988 amendments to the PriceAnderson Act "expressly maintained the applicability of state tort law in PAA actions . " 280 Based on a threshold requirement that the plaintiff prove that a "nuclear incident" had occurred according to the Act's standards, the Tenth Circuit disputed other circuit conclusions that "state tort standards of care, which may have some indirect effect on nuclear safety, are preempted by federal law . " 281 Without the proof of a nuclear incident, a plaintiff might still be able to get relief through state tort law . And the determination of whether such laws were preempted by federal nuclear regulations or set a standard of care in conflict with federal standards should be done on a case-by-case basis . 282 Such case-by-case uncertainty can be a serious barrier for development of new and potentially dangerous technologies, such as nuclear power and CCS .
While there is no current decision to reconcile these cases, 283 the process of determining whether federal law preempts state law is based on important considerations that would be relevant for carbon sequestration legislation .
First, "there is a strong presumption against preemption that may only be overcome by 'clear and manifest' congressional intent to oust state law . "
284 Second, this presumption is stronger when preemption would displace the traditional power of the state to protect the health and safety of its citizens . 285 Third, if preemption leaves an injured person without a state or federal remedy, "a court may ascribe preemptive intent to Congress only in the most compelling circumstances . "
286 Even if state law is not expressly preempted by Congress, it may be impliedly preempted if Congress occupies the entire field or the state law directly conflicts with federal law and stands as an obstacle to the federal legislative objectives . 287 However, as seen from the Cook case, conflict preemption may still leave room for state tort laws to apply . In the absence of express federal preemption, the courts would be unlikely to find there was implied federal preemption, because federal CCS laws occupy the field to the exclusion of state tort or property law or because the state-law conflicts with federal law . 288 On December 7, 2009, the EPA Administrator made an endangerment finding that six GHGs are air pollutants that may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare . EPA did not issue a finding that the endangerment finding cannot be the basis for tort actions . Instead, it responded as follows to concerns about increased litigation:
[T]he Administrator focuses her endangerment analysis on the science of GHGs and climate change, and not on the potential ramifications for civil tort litigation (corporate-or environmental justice-related) of regulations that may follow positive endangerment and cause or contribute findings .
This [endangerment finding] action is not the appropriate forum for opining on civil tort litigation . The issues before EPA concern the contribution of emissions from new motor vehicles and the impacts of the air pollution on the public health or welfare . 289 Because EPA has not yet issued a finding that its endangerment determination cannot be the basis for tort actions, it can reasonably be expected that many new tort cases will be filed .
A potential plaintiff in a tort action must plead a cause or causes of action that the legal system will recognize and provide a remedy if the plaintiff prevails . Almost any tortor property-based cause of action could potentially be the basis for a lawsuit brought to recover for personal injury or property damage caused by CCS . However, it can reasonably be predicted that nearly all actions will be based on private nuisance, trespass, public nuisance, negligence, or strict liability . Because plaintiffs are allowed to plead alternative causes of action, cases are likely to be brought that are based on multiple legal theories . Assuming the absence of federal preemption over state tort-based action, tort law offers a much greater range of remedies than is presently available under federal environmental laws . State tort law can provide injunctive relief and other equitable remedies . It provides compensatory money damages for personal injury and property damage and may allow for the recovery of punitive damages . The methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) cases show that contamination of groundwater can lead to damages in the hundreds of millions of dollars . 290 A private nuisance has its roots in property law . It is an indirect (or non-trespassory) invasion on another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land . 291 It may involve interference with the physical condition of land, such as polluting groundwater, or it may disturb the occupants of the land, which may occur if air pollutants impact the property . 292 It includes a threat of future injury, such as may occur when explosives or toxic material are stored on the land . 293 The invasion usually must be a substantial invasion of the property that is unreasonable, based on the values within the community . Determining whether conduct is an unreasonable interference requires a balancing of the interests of the parties . 294 For potential defendants, a nuisance cause of action is always a risk, because an activity may be ruled a nuisance by a court, even if the activity is lawful and properly operated . 295 Trespass is a direct interference with the right to exclusive possession of land . 296 Until the 1960s, trespass was not a cause of action that could provide relief for most environmental-based interferences with land, because the release of intangibles, such as air pollutants, light, energy, etc . onto another's land, was not considered a direct interference with possession of land . 297 This has changed, and the most important cases recognizing trespass as a valid cause of action to address air pollution are a series of cases in Oregon and Washington in the 1960s that involved fluoride emissions . 298 A trespass can be committed above or below the surface of the land . 299 Trespass offers the advantage that the statute of limitations begins when the interference causes substantial harm, but for a continuing trespass, it begins anew with each invasion . 300 The trespass doctrine is now an established remedy for aircraft overflights when there is a substantial interference with the use of land . 301 With modern pleading allowing alternative causes of action, private nuisance and trespass are usually both pleaded in a complaint . Trespass could be used by a plaintiff who can demonstrate reasonable and foreseeable damages from a defendant who engages in unauthorized use of the plaintiff's property interest in an underground pore space . 302 The ability to use trespass as a cause of action could be diminished, if a CCS regimen defined reasonable conduct and potential defendants could demonstrate that they acted within the permissible limits of the authorizing legal authority . 303 The limited case law on this subject deals primarily with secondary oil and gas recovery operations . 304 Public nuisance developed historically as an omnibus criminal offense that allowed the government to prevent interference with the rights of the community . 305 This cause of action often involves the government as the plaintiff, but an individual may also use this doctrine . A private right-of-action based on public nuisance requires the plaintiff to have suffered damage over and beyond that suffered by the public at large, and the injury must be different in kind, rather than in degree, from the injury suffered by the public . 306 Personal injury or a business interference suffered by only a limited group within the community will probably support a claim for public nuisance .
On January 13, 2009, a North Carolina federal district court ruled that the emissions from the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) coal-fired power plants in Alabama and Tennessee constituted a public nuisance in North Carolina, based on state law, despite the plant's compliance with CAA permits issued by Alabama and Tennessee . 307 The court based its decision on the principles found in the Restatement of Torts §821B(1) and (2) and required TVA to abate emissions at a cost of more than $1 billion beyond the $3 billion TVA had already planned to spend to reduce its emissions . 308 The TVA's emissions were released up to 100 miles from North Carolina and were a small part of the pollution load in the state . Moreover, the pollutants that allegedly caused harm were secondary pollutants, formed from releases from many sources after undergoing chemical change in the atmosphere . The case involved a judge in a downwind state determining what controls should be required in an upwind state . The court's decision that the defendants were responsible for harm over a large area could have allowed many potential plaintiffs to sue for damages, with the liability of the defendants already established based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel . 309 The case was appealed to the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which, on July 26, 2010, reversed, saying that the lower court's decision would encourage courts to use the vague public nuisance standards "to scuttle the nation's carefully created system for accommodating the need for energy production and the need for clean air . "
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The court went on to say: "It is difficult to understand how an activity expressly permitted and extensively regulated by both federal and state government could somehow constitute a public nuisance . " 311 It would appear that the court's opinion could extend to any nuisance case involving an activity subject to a clearly articulated national regulatory policy . 312 The first lawsuit to be filed to abate CO 2 emissions based on public nuisance was Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 313 in which eight states, the city of New York, and three environmental groups sued five electric utilities that are the five largest emitters of CO 2 in the United States . The plaintiffs sued the utilities seeking "abatement of [their] ongoing contribution to the public nuisance of global warming . " The district court ruled this was a political question and dismissed the case . 314 The case was appealed to the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where the procedural ruling was reversed, and the case was remanded to go forward for trial based on public nuisance under federal common law . 315 The court provided an exhaustive review of the law concerning nonjusticibility based on the political question doctrine, as well as the law of standing in its process of deciding the case is to go forward . The Second Circuit held that state, municipal, and private plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief for injuries alleged to be caused by climate change . Moreover, the court held that to have standing, the plaintiff need only show the defendant's discharge contributed to the kinds of injury suffered by the mental cases received a set back in Milwaukee II, when the Court ruled that the establishment of a comprehensive federal program for the control of water pollution subsequent to Milwaukee I precluded the federal courts from using federal common law to impose more stringent requirements than were imposed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) . 334 While it would be difficult to claim that a comprehensive federal program for CO 2 exists at this time, the efforts of EPA to control CO 2 using the CAA may soon displace the use of federal common law of nuisance as a cause of action .
An important aspect of private nuisance, public nuisance, and trespass is that these causes of action may result in equitable relief for the successful plaintiff, such as abatement of the nuisance, or, in an extreme case, shutting down a business . 335 In addition, money damages may be awarded . If the harm to the community from granting equitable relief is significant, however, only money damages may be granted, and the defendant may obtain the equivalent of an easement to continue harmful conduct in return for paying appropriate damages . 336 These causes of action usually involve balancing the benefits to the public from the activity against the harm to the plaintiffs . But if plaintiffs prove significant harm and causation, they will likely recover damages for their injury, even if other injunctive relief is not granted . 337 Negligence is the most common cause of action in the tort system . It requires a duty recognized by law that requires conformity to a standard; a breech of that duty that causes injury to a party; a close casual connection between the conduct and the injury (proximate cause); and an actual loss or damage . 338 For CCS cases, it will require showing a duty in an area that has little regulation . Ultimately, liability is going to rest on whether a reasonable care standard was met, which requires balancing the social utility of the conduct of the defendant against the risk to members of the public . 339 If a defendant's conduct was unreasonable, a plaintiff must further demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the injury .
Strict liability (also known as liability without fault) is imposed on abnormally dangerous activities or conditions . 340 It is normally imposed as a social policy to shift the risk of loss to the entity that can best prevent a harmful event from occurring . 341 Under the Restatement of Torts, a balancing among six factors is required . To impose liability, the courts will balance: (1) the degree of risk of harm;
(2) the likelihood that the harm will be substantial; (3) and the inability to eliminate the risk with reasonable care; against (4) whether the activity is common; (5) whether the activity is appropriate for a particular location; and (6) the value of the activity to the community in comparison to its risk . 342 The doctrine of strict liability has been applied to environmental contamination in 21 of 27 states that have considered this issue . 343 Two states, Texas and Wyoming, have rejected the doctrine . 344 If the government takes an action that materially limits the use of property, an inverse condemnation action may be brought to recover the value of the property taken . There does not need to be a formal taking using the power of eminent domain, nor is physical occupancy required . This doctrine has been used successfully for damage to or loss of the use of property from nearby highway construction, and it has been used for damage caused by lowflying aircraft . 345 Regardless of the legal theory pursued in a tort action involving CCS, proving causation may be a problem . Actions that cause harm may have occurred a decade or more before the case . There also may be problems of proof, if the injuries could be the result of exposure to many possible agents that may have been released from a variety of sources . 346 If the injury has multiple or an unknown etiology, proving a defendant was responsible can be difficult . Causation problems can also cut the other way . If causation cannot be definitively demonstrated, potential plaintiffs may be encouraged to gamble on a lawsuit . 347 The injuries that lead to lawsuits will involve injuries to property and/ or injuries to health and the environment . CO 2 storage can also injure underground mineral, natural gas, petroleum, and water resources . It can induce seismic events or ground subsidence . However, the statute of limitations could run before the harm caused by a potential defendant is discovered . Courts usually combat this problem by imposing a discovery rule that runs from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury . 348 
